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Article 6

BURDEN OF PROOF OF FRAUD IN THE
INCEPTION OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
By

FRANCIS

E.

DAILY

Ninety per cent of the payments made for exchange in
inter-state commerce are made by means of commercial paper.
Until the comparatively recent adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Laws, by the several states, the interpretations of
the laws governing negotiable instruments were not uniform.
One of the most controverted matters of negotiable instruments was that of the burden of proof in case the instrument
had been contaminated with fraud in its inception. For instance,
if A made a promissory note to B, who obtained it through
fraud, and B sold the same note to C, who had knowledge of the
fraud, the question is asked: Upon whom does the burden of
proving that the note was obtained through fraud rest? And
upon whom does the burden of proving that the present holder
had knowledge of the fraud rest? The Negotiable Instruments
Laws, in section 59, recites, "Every holder is deemed prima
facie to be a holder in due course; but, when it is shown that
the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was
defective, the burden is upon the holder to prove that he or someone else under whom he claims acquired the title in due course."
In regard to a defective title,, a title is said to be defectivve
within the meaning of this act when the person obtains the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force
or fear, or ohter unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration,
or when such person negotiates the instrument in breach of
faith, or under such circumstances as amount to fraud.
The enactment of this law makes it incumbent upon the
holder of the instrument, faudulent from its inception, to prove
that he has acquired title to the instrument, free from any
knowledge of the original fraud, and in good faith. But, any
holder of a negotiable instrument, which is valid on its face
is presumed to be a holder in due course, as set out in the above
cited, section 59, of the Negotiable Instruments Laws. The de-
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fendant maker, however, may defend his case upon the affirmative defense of fraud. After having pleaded this defense, it is
incumbnt itp 6 n the defendant maker to come forward with the
evidence of the fraud.
The minority view, upon the question of the burden of
proof, in case the instrument has been secured through means
of fraud, is that the defendant maker still assumes the burden of
proving that the holder had knowledge of the fraud, after he has
proved the original fraud. "If the endorsee of the note under
-the payee's fraud proves that he bought it before maturity,
the maker has the burden of proving the notice." Kenner v.
Almon, 202 Alabama 367, 80 Southwestern 449. Engler v.
Williams, Missouri Appellate, reported in 23 Southwestern 671.
Such holding, however, is in the small minority.
The defendant is entitled to have the evidence of fraud submitted to the jury. This is stipulated in Johnson County Savings- Bank v. Redfearn et al, (Missouri) 125 South Western 224,
"Where the- defendant maker, of a note pleads fraud as a defense, the evidence tending to prove fraud is evidence that should
be submitted to the jury.' In Rangley v. Harris, et ux, reported
in 81 Southeastern 346, it is held that, "a question whether the
notes or checks were procured through a fraudulent conspirac)
entered into between the plaintiff and another, the evidence
should be submitted to a jury."
If the defendant maker offers satisfactory proof that the
notes were procured through fraud, by the original payee, or
one claiming under him, and the plaintiff offers no evidence that
he secured the notes in good faith, the defendant is entitled to
a verdict. 115 N. Y. Supplement, 1074. And, 109 Pacific 596.
Also, 78 Atlantic, 1002. But, if the plaintiff proves satisfactorily
that he purchased the instrument in go6d faith, and such proof
is not refuted'by the defendant maker, then the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. In Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah 351, 113
Pacific 77, this point is clearly discussed. The court recites that,
"Upon proof of fraud by the payee, casts upon-the holder not
merely the duty of going forward, but the burden of proving
that he or someone else under whom he claims, acquired title as
a holder in due course." The burden of proof remains upon the
holder and does not shift, though the burden of proceeding may
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shift even though the defendant introduce evidence to contradict
the plaintiff, since upon this point the defendant is enitled to
have the case submitted to the jury."
This matter requiring the plaintiff to prove that he is a
holder without knowledge of the fraud requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, by the weight of the evidence.
Hurley v. Wilby 18 Arizona 45, 156 Pacific 83.
In federal courts the burden of proving fraud and that
the plaintiff was appraised of it, is upon the defendant maker.
This seems to be based upon the rules of evidence. Young v.
Lowry 192 Federal Reporter 825. And, Washington, etc., Ry. Co.
v. Murray 211 Federal Reporter 440.
If there is an apparent alteration of a negotiable instrument,
by the payee, then a different question arises as to the burden
of proof, yet, not very dissimilar. When an instrument is so
altered as to create the suspicion of the person holding, the purchaser, is obligated to explain this. Arnold v. Wood, 127 Arkansas 234, 191 Northwestern 960. Also, Peevey v. Buchanan; 133
Tennessee 24, 173 Southwestern 447. But, if an instrument is
apparently unaltered, and is valid upon its face, the holder is
presumed to be a holder in due course, as is above stated, and
it is then incumbent upon the defendant maker to prove that
the instrument has been altered. Wagar v. Tobin 104:,Kansas
211, 178 Pacific 751. Kapp v. Levyson 58 Oklahoma 651, 160
Pacific 457. The minority view upon this question, is, in effect,'
that such rule has no application in civil cases, but only in criminal cases. Harvard Law Review 202, 213.
Therefore, the plaintiff holding a negotiable instrument is
presumed to be a holder in due course. The presumption obtains
until the defendant maker proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that there was fraud in the inception of the instrument.
Thus, it becomes incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that he
is a purchaser in good faith, also by a preponderance of the
evidence. And, in cases of alteration by fraud,, the presumption
still obtains, unless on the face of the instrument there is something to create suspicion, when, the plaintiff must immediately
explain such apparent alteration, otherwise, the defendant must
prove that there has been no alteration made.

